Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was a key figure at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, having previously signed both the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation. He attended every session, actively contributing to debates on representation and executive power. When the final document was presented, however, he was one of only three delegates present who refused to sign. His dissent stemmed from deep philosophical disagreements with the proposed framework of the new national government.
The Absence of a Bill of Rights
Gerry’s most famous objection to the Constitution centered on its complete lack of a specific declaration of rights for the citizenry. He argued that without enumerated protections, the new federal government would possess an unchecked authority that could easily be used to oppress individual liberties. His experience as a Revolutionary figure made him deeply suspicious of any government not explicitly bound by a charter detailing what it could not do to its people.
He believed the omission was dangerous because it left citizens vulnerable to the tyranny they had fought a war to escape. Specifically, he feared the general clauses of the Constitution, such as the power to raise armies and revenue, could be used without restraint against the people. He maintained that a document creating a new, powerful national authority must include safeguards for fundamental rights like freedom of the press and trial by jury in all cases.
Late in the convention, Gerry formally moved to include a Bill of Rights and requested a committee be formed to draft one, but his proposal was voted down. Many delegates contended that such a list was unnecessary because the new government had limited, delegated powers. This rejection solidified Gerry’s belief that the Constitution was fundamentally flawed and presented an inherent threat to freedom.
Structural Fears of Centralized Authority
Beyond the lack of a Bill of Rights, Gerry harbored profound reservations about the federal government’s internal structure, viewing it as dangerously aristocratic and monarchical. He was particularly concerned with the design of the executive branch, fearing the presidency would evolve into a single-man rule reminiscent of the British monarchy. He repeatedly voiced concerns about the President’s eligibility for re-election, which he believed could lead to corruption and an eventual life-tenure, effectively establishing an elective king.
Gerry objected to the proposed method of electing the executive, preferring state governors or their electors select the President over the Electoral College mechanism. He argued that the power of the President to appoint officials and the lack of robust impeachment provisions made the office too independent and unaccountable. The blending of the executive and legislative functions, particularly the Senate’s role in advising and consenting to appointments and treaties, further fueled his suspicion that the new government lacked proper separation of powers.
His concerns extended to the legislative branch; he saw the Senate as an aristocratic body detached from the common people. Gerry worried that the power granted to Congress was excessively vague, especially under the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This broad grant of authority, he believed, would allow the federal legislature to overstep its bounds and eventually dissolve the state governments.
Finally, Gerry expressed apprehension regarding the judicial branch, which he deemed potentially oppressive and capable of exercising unchecked power. He specifically cited the ability to establish federal tribunals without the security of a jury trial in certain civil cases as a significant threat to individual liberty. For Gerry, these structural deficiencies across all three branches represented a system poised to concentrate power rather than disperse it, making the government a potential instrument of tyranny.
Objections to the Ratification Process
Gerry’s final objections centered on the procedural manner in which the Constitution was to be adopted. He viewed the effort as exceeding the convention’s original mandate, which was only to revise the Articles of Confederation. The sudden creation of an entirely new system, he argued, lacked the popular legitimacy required for such a fundamental change.
He specifically opposed the provision that the document would be ratified by special state conventions rather than by the existing state legislatures. Gerry saw this as a dangerous and illegitimate shortcut designed to bypass the established political structure and rush the adoption of a deeply flawed document.
Gerry questioned the logic of adopting a document that its proponents admitted would likely require immediate amendments. He argued that any necessary changes should be made before ratification. His opposition to the process was rooted in a belief that the speed and method of adoption demonstrated a disregard for republican principles.